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THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE IN
FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
MALCOLM

B.

PARSONS

One of the central issues in American administrative law concerns
the extent to which the courts, in providing relief afforded by statute
and constitutional due process, may upset the actions of administrative
bodies. Increasingly the traditional law-fact dichotomy becomes tenuous in the administrative process. Questions of law are often so inextricably bound to the facts that there is small chance of upsetting
rulings without first upsetting the findings at their base. The scope
of review thus increasingly turns on the question of how an alleged
conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact may successfully be
challenged.
There has been a marked tendency in administrative law as it
has evolved during the past forty years to make findings of administrative agencies assailable only if unsupported by "substantial evidence."
Although it now appears as part of both the Federal Administrative
2
Procedure Act' and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
and in a good many separate statutes setting up national or state
regulatory agencies besides, this standard is largely of judicial rather
than legislative origin. And, at any rate, whether employed on statutory invocation or merely through judicial initiative, the meaning of
the standard, of course, depends on how the courts construe it;:
.

. . the term might conceivably mean several different things ranging

all the way from a bare minimum of evidence being regarded as sufficient to sustain a decision to a virtual requirement that the decision
4
be supported by a preponderance of the testimony."
MAJOR FIELDs OF OPERATION OF THE RULE

Florida has no general administrative procedure legislation, nor
260 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. §1009 (1946).
29A U.L.A. §12 (Supp. 1952), not adopted in Florida.
342 Am. JuR., Public Administrative Law, §217 (1942).
4

Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. oF PA. L. Rmv.

1026, 1035 (1941).

[4811
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do the separate statutes governing the more important regulatory
administrative processes contain any explicit substantial evidence
provisions. As to the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, the
law provides: 5
"Every rule, regulation, schedule or order heretofore or hereafter made by the commissioners shall be deemed . . . within
their jurisdiction ...reasonable and just ... and arrived at in
due form of procedure ... unless the contrary plainly appears
on the face thereof or be made to appear by dear and satisfactory evidence .... .
Until 1941 the statute establishing Industrial Commission procedures in workmen's compensation cases provided that the commission
was not "bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence or by
technical or formal rules of procedure. '"6 At that time, however, the
Legislature restated this provision in a more limited form that failed
to ordain freedom from technical rules of evidence: "In making an
investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing the commission shall
not be bound by technical or formal rules of procedure ... but may
make such investigation or inquiry, or conduct such hearing in such
manner as to best ascertain the right of the parties."
The "dear and satisfactory evidence" requirement in Railroad
Commission cases is sufficiently ambivalent to allow the courts great
discretion in deciding what it means. And, although the 1941 amendment to the workmen's compensation law seems inferentially to have
been designed to restrict Industrial Commission procedure within
the confines of "technical or statutory rules of evidence," this change
in terminology is even more a matter for judicial construction. Actually, there is no shift in court decisions after 1941 that reflects this
particular change in the wording of the statute. The significant thing
is the extent to which the scope of review seems not to be affected by
the statute. The rule that administrative findings will not be set
aside if predicated on substantial evidence is as important in the
administrative law of Florida as in jurisdictions which have this rule
in their statutes. In this state it has been most often used in the ju5FLA, STAT. §350-12 (1) (m) (1951).

Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17481.

7FLA. STAT. §440.29 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20672.
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dicial review of actions taken by the Railroadiand Public Utilities
Commission, by the Industrial Commission in workmen's compensation cases, and by such various local or state agencies as civil service
boards, professional licensing boards, and boards of education, having
authority to interfere with positions of protected tenure.
Administrative activity in these three areas is widely divergent.
The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has broad powers
for the regulation and prescription of the rates, routes, and services of
rail and motor transportation and public utility corporations doing
business in Florida. Here the most important administrative skills
are highly specialized branches of accounting and economics, coupled
with an ability to gauge the aspirations of private business concerns
against a yardstick that the Legislature "by a discreet generality in
its use of language to describe the object intended to be achieved"8
called the public convenience and necessity. The Industrial Commission, with authority to adjust claims of workers injured in their
employment, functions under circumstances in which the factual
findings underlying compensation awards are frequently obfuscated
by lack of agreement among medical experts as to the nature, extent,
and cause of disabling physical injuries. The third area, while perhaps less technical, is as complicated in its own way because it involves finding facts to constitute cause for suspension or removal of
persons from positions of protected tenure, particularly when cause
is stipulated in some such imprecise term as "immorality," or "conduct unbecoming an officer."
What constitutes substantial evidence to support administrative
action in these three different areas has been viewed traditionally as
a question of law for the courts, because a lack of this evidence constitutes an abuse of authority and consequently a denial of constitutional due process, federal and state. The basic difficulty remains,
however; the judiciary, like other branches, "cannot escape . . . the
use of undefined defining terms."9 There must be substantial evidence;
but what is "substantial"? Whatever meaning the term has, and the
extent, if any, to which it has also become appliably formulistic in
Florida administrative law, depend upon how the" judges have expressed and used it and with what consistency under the circumstances.
8Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 118 Fla. 526, 532, 160 So. 22,
24 (1935).
gUniversal Camera Cbrp.'v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
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RAILROAD AND

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION CASES

In the half-century of relationship between the Florida Railroad
and Public Utilities Commission and the Florida Supreme Court no
single unequivocal verbal prescription has emerged to characterize
what the Court demands in the way of evidence to sustain the agency's
determinations. At least seven different expressions have been used
at one time or another: (1) "appropriate evidence," 10 (2) "substantial
evidence, '"1 (3) "substantial and pertinent evidence,"12 (4) "substantial competent evidence,"' (5) "ample legal evidence, "14 (6) "legally
sufficient evidentiary basis," 15 and (7) "substantial competent evidence that is legally sufficient."1 6 On occasion the Court has also
made statements about the "whole record" 7 that are somewhat suggestive of the language of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.s
Set down in some such organized sequence as above, the standard
seems clearly to develop along ite two separate lines of "substantial
competent" and "legally sufficient" evidence until they merge. Actually, there has been no chronologically consistent evolution; and
despite the apparently greater rigidity of some of the statements the
Court seems on occasions to have been able to broaden or narrow its
scope of review quite as well under one verbalism as another. One
lOGreat Southern Trucking Co. v. Mack, 54 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1951).

"iState ex rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 752, 106 So. 576,
587 (1925).
'12 State cx rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Florida E. C. Ry., 64 Fla. 112, 137, 59 So.
385, 393 (1912).
IsBenton Bros. Film Express v. Florida R.R. and Pub. Util. Comm'n, 57 SO.2d
435, 437 (Fla. 1952); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Matthews, 104 Fla. 603, 605, 140 So.
469, 470 (1932).
14Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 149 Fla. 245, 259, 5 So.2d 708, 713
(1942); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Douglas, 147 Fla. 552, 557, 3 So.2d 526,
528 (1941).
l5State ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 77 Fla. 366, 377, 81 So.
498, 501 (1919).
16Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 101 Fla. 1018, 1044, 132 So.
851, 862 (1931), followed in Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Douglass, 148 Fla. 598,
605, 4 So.2d 856, 859 (1941).
ilPensacola Transit, Inc. v. Douglass, 160 Fla. 192, 201, 34 So.2d 555, 560 (1948);
see also note 16 supra.
's60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. §1009 (1946). Subsection (e) provides: "In making the
foregoing determinations [grounds for setting aside agency action] the court shall
review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party,
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error."
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EVIDENCE RULE

reason for this is the fact that the substantial evidence rule, at least
as far as review of the Railroad Commission's actions is concerned,
has always been very closely linked with other standards of review
which, semantically, have been at least equally vague. One of these
was the "rule of reason." The Florida Supreme Court early moved to
the position that, regardless of the evidence adduced in support of
administrative orders, if they were unreasonable they were unlawful.
What was unreasonable? According to the Court, speaking in 1911:19
"The reasonableness of a rate, rule, regulation or order of
the Railroad Commissioners is to be determined by a consideration of the rights of all parties directly and materially
affected ....
This involves a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances by such appropriate processes and standards of
reasoning and computation as are afforded by law or by common experience and the dictates of right and justice."
Starting with this notion of reasonableness, the Court expanded it
in the following year into one of the earliest judicial formulations of
0
the substantial evidence rule in Florida administrative law:2
"If the Commission makes a rate, rule or regulation without
statutory authority, or without giving the carrier affected by it
a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or without obtaining
or considering any substantial and pertinent evidence, where
investigation, inquiry and evidence are necessary as a basis for
the action taken, the proceeding is not had in due course of
law . . .
At this same time the Court was also saying that administrative action
2
must not be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. 1
During the 'twenties the Florida Supreme Court, in a series of
important cases, further broadened the standard of review for the
actions of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission. In 1925 it
loState ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Louisville 9c N.R.R., 62 Fla. 315, 359, 57 So.
175, 189 (1911). This is an early example of a Railroad Commission order overruled
in part because "unreasonable."
2OState ex 7el. Railroad Comm'rs v. Florida E.C. Ry., 64 Fla. 112, 137, 59 So.
385, 393 (1912).
2lState ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Florida E.C. Ry., 67 Fla. 83, 64 So. 443
(1914).
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phrased this multiple standard, then in the making although not in
22
final form:
"Where there is substantial evidence to sustain the regulation
and no rule of law is violated by the regulation the courts will
in general enforce it. But as a matter of organic law the making
of such regulations is not conclusive of their validity; and where
a regulation is promulgated without substantial evidence to
support it, or in violation or disregard of controlling provisions
or principles of law to the injury of fundamental rights, or its
practical operation would be essentially unreasonable or unjust
to those affected by it, the courts will not enforce it."
The five essential points in this standard are substantial evidence,
legality, respect of fundamental rights, reasonableness, and justice. Important as all of these concepts are in American jurisprudence, it is
no disparagement to remark that they are also - perhaps conveniently
- vague.
In 1919 the Court said that administrative orders had to be supported by a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" in order to be enforceable.23 In 1931 this concept was added to the traditional substantial evidence rule, but with the important addition of still another requirement -that of competence, thus making of substantial
evidence itself a threefold standard and weaving it into the still
broader multiple standard:24
"If there is substantial competent evidence that is legally
sufficient to support the findings and conclusions and no rule
of law was violated in the proceedings, and the whole record
does not show an abuse of authority or arbitrary action, the
findings and conclusions of the Commission will not be set
aside . ., even though the reviewing court might have reached
different conclusions on the evidence."
This does not mean, however, that in all Railroad Commission
22State ex rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 752, 106 So. 576,
587 (1925); cf. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129

So. 876 (1980).
23

State ex rel. Railroad Comm'n v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 77 Fla. 866, 81 So. 498

(1919).
.

24Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Railroad Comm'n, 101 Fla. 1018, 1044, 182

So. 851, 862 (1981).
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cases turning on substantial evidence since 1931 the Court has used
the "substantial, competent, legally sufficient evidence" language of
this threefold standard. The next year an order was sustained with
the words . . . we cannot say that there was no substantial and competent evidence in the record ... ."25 But in 1935 the Court abandoned
this language in favor of "such affirmative finding bottomed on a
sufficient factual showing to substantially support it ... "28 In 1941,
again sustaining an order, the Court observed that "there is ample
legal evidence in the record as properly made to sustain the findings
"27 A year later it recognized the requirement that there be
"ample legal evidence in the record as properly made" 28 and, in
sustaining the Railroad Commission's order, ruled that "on the showing made it appears that there is substantial evidence in the record
"29
During these same years, and again
to support the findings ....
in 1948 and 1951, the Court reverted to the threefold "substantial
competent evidence that is legally sufficient" standard in four important decisions. 30
It is clear, then, that the language used by our Supreme Court in
describing the substantial evidence requirement when reviewing
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission actions has not been uniform, either in development or in application. The leading modem
case seems to be the one that first expressed the requirement as a
threefold standard of substantiality, competency, and legal sufficiency, 31 but the Court has not felt constrained to recite this formula
in every appropriate circumstance since 1931. Furthermore the substantial evidence rule, even when threefold, has usually been applied
as simply one part of a broader multiple standard in which the Court
has looked for "illegality, .... denial of fundamental rights," "unreason25Louisville & N. R.R. v. Matthews, 104 Fla. 603, 605, 140 So. 469, 470 (1932).
2-Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 118 Fla. 555, 566, 160 So. 26,

30 (1935).
2
7Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Douglas, 147 Fla. 552, 557, 3 So.2d 526, 528
(1941).
2sAtlantic C.L.R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 149 Fla. 245, 259, 5 So.2d 708, 713

(1942).
29Ibid.

3Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Mack, 54 So.2d 153 (1951); Pensacola Transit,
Inc. v. Douglass, 160 Fla. 192, 34 So.2d 555 (1948); Florida Motor Lines Corp. v.
Douglass, 150 Fla. 1, 7 So.2d 843 (1941); Florida Motor Lines Corp v. Douglass,
148 Fla. 598, 4 So.2d 856 (1941).
3lFlorida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851

(1931).
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ableness," "arbitrariness," or "injustice." In this context the scope
of review has been very extensive, even allowing for the fact that these
standards are all customarily styled questions of law rather than of
fact.3 2
The most important problem, regardless of language, is the extent to which the courts, in applying the substantial evidence rule,
actually weigh the evidence openly or despite protestations to the
contrary. The idea of substantiality is elastic, and so also are the ideas
of competency and legal sufficiency. When it is considered that many
of the disputes which reach the Florida Supreme Court involve controversial "facts," one more imponderable has been added. These
difficulties can best be understood by examining leading cases in which
the actions of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
have been sustained or overruled.
A 1931 decision 33 involved a dispute between two bus companies
operating between Jacksonville and Miami. One of the companies,
Georgia-Florida Motor Lines, sought permission to substitute five
24-passenger buses for five 7-passenger sedans in operation on its
route. The other company, Florida Motor Lines, opposed this bid.
The basic question for the commission, as always in such circumstances,
was whether such a change would serve public convenience and
necessity. The answer to this question lay in a controverted fact area;
one bus company said it would, the other that it would not. Both introduced evidence to prove their point. Counsel for both companies
argued impressively. Within this vital, open dispute at least two important economic facts were uncontestedly implicit: that in 1931 methods of motor transportation were improving, and that the supplier of
the more modern facilities would tend to gain a competitive advantage
- contingent, of course, on public demand for the service. The con.°2Review of the administrative determinations gf the Florida Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission by the Florida Supreme Court has come entirely on
original writs of certiorari or mandamus; hence there is supposed to be no determination of facts de novo at the appellate level. See Greater Miami Corp. v.
Pender, 142 Fla. 390, 194 So. 867 (1940); State v. Rose, 123 Fla. 544, 167 So. 21
(1936); Medlin-Peacock Buick v. Broward, 101 Fla. 600, 135 So. 156 (1931); Ulsch
v. Mountain City Mill Co., 103 Fla. 932, 138 So. 483, 140 So. 218 (1931); Atlantic
C.L.R.R. v. Florida Fine Fruit Co., 93 Fla. 161, 112 So. 66, 113 So. 384 (1927);
American Ry. Express v. Weatherford, 84 Fla. 264, 93 So. 740 (1922); Goodrich and
Cone, Mandamus in Florida, 4 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 535 (1951); Rogers and Baxter,
Certiorariin Florida, id at 477.
S3Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851
(1931).
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tingent fact led back into the area of controversy, but it also explained
why one company asked for the order and the other opposed it.
The commission, after weighing the evidence, issued the order
allowing Georgia-Florida Motor Lines to make the change. Florida
Motor Lines maintained on certiorari, as it had before the commission,
that there was "no necessity for further passenger facilities over the
route."34 Two of the justices agreed with the petitioner; but the
majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Whitfield, supported the commission. Applying the triadic standard, the Supreme Court held that
there was "substantial competent evidence ...legally sufficient to support the findings and conclusions" and that the commission's findings
would not be set aside "even though the reviewing court might have
reached different conclusions on the evidence." 35
Nothing illustrates so well as dissent the perplexity of the fact
problem, whether it is dissent on the bench, as above, or dissent in
the commission. In 1937 a case reached the Court from a divided
commission.31 Two of the commissioners denied a bus company's
application for a certificate to operate over certain state highways,
holding that it had not made a showing of public convenience and
necessity. The other commissioner, in an extensive dissenting opinion,
insisted that the showing had been made. On certiorari the Supreme
Court held per curiam for the bus company and quashed the order
in an opinion relying almost entirely on the dissenting commissioner's
opinion, although it also quoted one statement from the majority to
establish the position that the order was controverted by the findings
of fact. This statement, that "'the evidence in this case tends to show
that ...

part of the "public" . . . is suffering to some extent from a

lack of through transportation facilities,' "37 from which in context
two of the commissioners drew a different conclusion, coupled with
the findings of the dissenting commissioner, led the Court to hold:
"The finding of fact as stated.., is, in effect, a finding that... Petitioner.., had met the burden ..."and "[tihe record amply supports the contention that the Commission departed from the essential
requirements of law ....

,"38

Hard economic facts in the competitive struggle between the rail34d. at 1031, 132 So. at 857.
351d. at 1044, 132 So. at 862.
3
OTamiami Trail Tours v. Railroad Comm'n, 128 Fla. 25, 174 So. 451 (1937).
371d. at 30, 174 So. at 453.
38Id. at 30, 31, 174 So. at 453.
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roads and the trucking companies underlay a decision by a divided
Court in 1942. 31 Upholding a commission order granting permission
to Flamingo Truck Lines to carry freight over a route also served by
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, the Court held six to one that there
was "ample legal evidence" and "substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings of the Commission ... "40 The dissent relied
on decisions a decade earlier that had favored the railroads in such
disputes; 4 but the majority, through Mr. Justice Buford, called attention to altered circumstances in the transportation field.
During these same years the Supreme Court split four to three in a
case pivoting openly on whether weighing the evidence is exclusively
a commission function.4 2 The commission had issued an order approving over the protest of a competitor an application of GeorgiaFlorida Coaches for service between the state line and Williston. On
certiorari this competitor, Florida Motor Lines, alleged that the commission had no jurisdiction because of deficiencies in the application.
The Supreme Court, in denying certiorari and upholding the commission, held unanimously on the first hearing that, although precise
43
procedural requirements had not been followed:
"The jurisdictional requirements were met before the Commission assumed to adjudicate the application.
"...the orders made are not shown to be illegal or unauthorized or in abuse of reasonable discretion . . . and there
has not been made to appear a fatal departure from the requirements of law."
On the equally important question of evidence the Court, applying its
threefold test of substantiality, competency, and legal sufficiency, ruled
that the record disclosed such evidence in support of the order. 4 On
rehearing Florida Motor Lines again challenged the existence of
evidentiary support for the commission's decision that Georgia-Florida
Coaches should serve the territory,' 5 an issue apparently already setS9Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 149 Fla. 245, 5 So.2d 708 (1942).
401d. at 259, 5 So.2d at 713.
41Id. at 263, 5 So.2d at 713.
42Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Douglass. 150 Fla. 1, 7 So2d 843 (1941).
4sId. at 13, 14, 7 So.2d at 848.
44Id. at 10, 11, 7 So.2d at 847.
-51d. at 14, 7 So.2d at 849.
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tled by the Court. Nevertheless, on the same testimony already considered by the commission and once by the Court itself, only four
justices were willing to sustain the order; the other three voted to
quash it. Mr. Justice Buford found himself in the anomalous position
of writing the dissenting opinion in the second hearing after having
spoken for a unanimous Court in the first. "After rehearing," he
said, ". . . the present writer has reached the conclusion that we
should indulge in a judicial repast of crow."46 Although two of his
brethren joined him in this unappetizing performance, the majority,
speaking through Mr. Justice Chapman, stood by the original decision and lectured the dissenters for weighing the evidence: 47
"The Florida Railroad Commission heard testimony and
decided these controversial questions of fact. The question
arises as to what weight shall be accorded the orders of the
Florida Railroad Commission on questions of fact by the
Supreme Court of Florida. It has concluded that the petitioner
has 'never served this territory' and the facts appearing in the
record support this view.... The question of the weight of
the evidence is for the Commission and not for the courts, even
though this court may have reached a different conclusion on
the same testimony."
In its underlying fact controversy this was a puzzling case, both
because of the complexity and overlapping of the existing and projected routes - tied as they were, for example, by interlocking requirements that carriers accommodate the passengers of their competitors over parts of the area - and because of the attitude of Florida
Motor Lines, "stubbornly" contesting "the right of the Commission
to award a certificate to a competitor." 48 In the first hearing the
substantial evidence question that dominated the second was settled although largely obscured by consideration of alleged procedural
and jurisdictional deficiencies. It is difficult to account for the shifting
alignment in these decisions unless the three dissenting justices actually
did weigh the evidence on rehearing, as the majority alleged, after
presumably having accepted it once as substantial, competent, and
legally sufficient. On the other hand, who is to say that the four
46Id. at 23, 7 So.2d at 851, Terrell and Adams, JJ., concurring.
471d. at 22, 7 So.2d at 851.

48Id, at 18, 7 So. 2d at 849.
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affirming justices did not, in reality, also weigh the evidence when
applying the same threefold standard which led them to sustain the
order?
In 1951 the Court unanimously quashed a commission order denying a railroad permission to close one of its stations from June through
October each year.4 9 The railroad had presented testimony that the
station would still be open during the busiest season of the year; that
freight, passenger, and express service would continue even though
it was dosed; that adequate station service would still be available
in nearby communities; and that the salary paid the agent at this
particular station exceeded the revenues derived from its operations.
In addition the commission had received in evidence petitions signed
by some six hundred citizens of the small community urging that
the railroad's request be denied. The commission, apparently impressed most by the petitions, decided against the railroad.
The Court overruled the commission; but the opinion did not
admit that the evidence had been weighed - otherwise than by the
commission:5 0
"It is established law that this Court will not interfere with
conclusions reached by the Railroad Commission as to factual
matters, but in instances where the Railroad Commission fails
or omits to correctly construe or interpret the legal effect
of the testimony, when considered in its entirety, then this Court,
on petition for certiorari, will give to such testimony the interpretation that should have been given by the Railroad
Commission."
Future cases will probably help delineate how finely the distinction
can be drawn between "weighing the evidence" on the one hand and
merely "correctly construing its legal effect" on the other.
An interesting bit of dicta in another 1951 decision suggests the
feelings of the Court when caught in the vortex of fact controversies.'
The commission's order had authorized the extension of service by
the M. R. and R. Trucking Company into an area which the Great
Southern Trucking Company insisted that it adequately served. The
Court sustained the order as based on "a sufficient factual showing to
49Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. King, 51 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1951).
soId. at 724.
5"Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Mack, 54 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1951).
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substantially support it";52 but there seemed to be just a touch of
wistfulness in Mr. Justice Chapman's final impotent deference to the
53
position of petitioner:
"We find considerable merit to a portion of the comments of
counsel as expressed in their briefs and in able oral argument
heard at the bar of this Court but our answer thereto is that
the applicable law simply does not permit or allow this Court
to substitute its conclusions on factual matters for the findings
of the Railroad Commission."
One final case may be cited to illustrate the Court's view that a
divided commission made an incorrect ruling upon the evidence. 54
Benton Brothers, licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to transport between Atlanta and designated points in Florida motion
picture films and various edibles customarily dispensed in theatres,
was authorized by the Florida commission to transport films only.
Three years later, in May 1951, Benton Brothers asked it to extend its
certificate to the inclusion of the edibles. Upon opposition from
certain other distributors in the area the commission took 330 pages of
testimony from 18 witnesses, pro and con, heard counsel, and decided
two to one against the requested extension. Benton Brothers asked
the Supreme Court on certiorari to quash the order as "a departure
from the essential requirements of the law and . . .without legal
foundation in fact or law.... .,5 After citing the substantial evidence
rule the Court sustained the petitioner on the grounds that granting
the extension would simply bring the Florida certificate into harmony
with the authority granted federally and that ".... the two Commissioners entering the order . . .applied to the evidence ... the law
applicable to the issuance of an original Certificate" rather than to
a mere extension.56
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

CASES

Judicial review of workmen's compensation awards has not been
MId.
at 155.
5rId. at 156.
G4Benton Bros. Film Express, Inc. v. Florida R.R. and Pub. Util. Comm'n, 57
So.2d 435 (Fla. 1952).
551d. at 437.
56d. at 438.
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characterized by so wide a range of terminology in following the substantial evidence rule as is found in the decisions on Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission actions. Here the verbal standard seems
to be competency and substantiality only.57 The Court has also uniformly held, under this twofold substantial evidence rule, that determinations of probity pertain to the administrative process rather
than to the judicial.5s The most striking thing about the substantial
evidence rule in these cases, however, is its comparative newness. Because of a judicial discretion on appeal somewhat broader than that
available in either the certiorari or the mandamus proceedings used
in Railroad Commission cases, the prevailing position was expressed
as follows in Florida Forest Park Service v. Strickland as recently as
1944:59

"In considering the case on the record, no presumption obtains
in favor of the correctness of the administrative determination
of fact, but the circuit court should give to the findings of the
commission about the same weight and consideration which a
chancellor should properly give to the findings of law and fact
of a master."
Nevertheless this area must be watched closely, inasmuch as the 1953
Legislature changed the method of review of Industrial Commission
cases from appeal to the circuit court 0 to review by the Supreme
Court on certiorari.6 1
The first inkling of conscious change came in 1945, one year after
the Strickland decision quoted above. In upholding a compensation
award to parents for the death of their son, reversed by the circuit
57Boca Raton Club v. Duff, 63 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1953); Crescent City v. Green,
59 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1951); United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55
So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951); Duff v. Boca Raton Club, 2 Fla. Supp. 144 (l1th Cir. 1952).
5sSee note 57 supra; Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So.2d 17 (1952);
Crawford v. Benrus Market, 40 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
59154 Fla. 472, 480, 18 So.2d 251, 255 (1944); cf. Florence Citrus Growers v.
Parrish, 160 Fla. 685, 36 So.2d 369 (1948); Star Fruit v. Canady, 159 Fla. 488, 32
So.2d 2 (1947); Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56, 198 So. 802 (1941);
St. Petersburg v. Mosedale, 146 Fla. 784, 1 So2d 878 (1941); Dixie Laundry v.
Wentzell, 145 Fla. 569, 200 So. 860 (1940); Firestone Auto Supply & Serv. Stores v.
Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940).
60FLA. STAT. §440.27 (1951).
61FIa. Laws 1953, c. 28241, §9. The constitutionality of this provision is currently being contested.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 1
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
court, the Supreme Court held through Mr. Justice Adams in McCall
v. Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc., "The only testimony is that of the
claimants. There are no substantial conflicts in it, consequently
our determination must rest upon the legal effect of the evidence."' 2
Then, veering away from the position taken in the Strickland case and
toward the substantial evidence concept, the opinion continued: "It
is clear beyond any question that the Industrial Commission was
justified in the award. The rule is well established that their [sic]
award will be upheld if there is substantial testimony before them." 63
Again, in 1949, the Court moved still closer to the substantial evidence rule and added the corollary that determining probity in such
cases is an administrative rather than a judicial function. In upholding a compensation award reversed by the circuit court the Supreme
Court in Crawford v. Benrus Market noted: "The sole question for
our determination is whether or not the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the award of the Deputy Commissioner as affirmed by the
Industrial Commission."64 Mr. Justice Terrell continued:
"Much of the evidence of the claimant was denied by the
carrier, in fact, it may be admitted for argument that the
numberical [sic] strength of the evidence supports the decree
appealed from, but the probative effect of the evidence is
not determined by counting noses. In a case like this the probity
of the evidence is for the Industrial Commission to determine
and their finding should not be reversed unless shown to be
clearly erroneous.
"There was ample evidence to support this finding and there
was medical testimony consistent with it."
By 1950 the Court's new position in workmen's compensation cases
seemed to be quite well established. In another decision reversing
the circuit court Mr. Justice Terrell, referring to both the McCall
and Crawford cases cited above, said that the Supreme Court had
"committed itself to the doctrine that.., the probity of the evidence
is for the Industrial Commission ....
65
This new position has come, however, only over protest within
Fla. 854, 855, 22 So.2d 153 (1945).
43Ibid.
02155

$440 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
OsSonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Campton, 46 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1950).
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the Supreme Court itself, and not without involving some lack of
assurance as to the most appropriate organization within the Industrial
Commission for the adjudication of workmen's compensation claims.
These difficulties are clearly reflected in action taken by the Florida
Legislature in 1941 and in several important cases a decade later.
Prior to 1941 the administrative organization of the Florida Industrial Commission for adjudication of workmen's compensation
claims provided, under statute, that a deputy commissioner might
conduct the hearing, but that within seven days from notice of his
award a review could be obtained before the full commission, which
could in effect conduct the hearing de novo. 66 In 1941 the Legislature
amended the statute to provide that the hearing "shall be conducted
by the deputy commissioner,"8 7 and that within twenty days he shall
make an award, which is final unless review is requested within seven
days from notice of award. On review, however, "the full commission
shall consider the matter upon the record . . ."68 The Legislature,
taking into account the increasing burden on the commission in deciding workmen's compensation claims, apparently intended to push factfinding and decision-making back to the deputy commissioner level,
with a limited full commission review as a check on the deputies. Yet
no realization of this shift appeared in the Supreme Court opinions
for a full ten years after the new provisions became law; and when
the realization finally did come the Court had for five years been in
the throes of accepting the substantial evidence rule as a basis for reviewing the workmen's compensation awards.
In moving toward the substantial evidence rule in the McCall and
Crawford decisions the Court had said that the probity of the evidence
was an issue to be determined by the Industrial Commission; and
the 1950 opinion in Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton 9 made it
clear that the term "Industrial Commission" meant the full commission
in the hearing process, not just the generic identity as a whole of the
agency entrusted with the administrative process of adjusting workmen's compensation claims. This viewpoint persisted despite the
1941 amendment. A deputy commissioner had awarded compensation
to Compton for an injury to his right big toe and had denied a claim
for additional compensation. The time for seeking review by the
6BF6a. Laws 1935, c. 17481.
§440.25 (3)
(b) (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20672.
§440.25(4) (1951).
6946 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1950).
67FLA. STAT.
68FLA. STAT.
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full commission had expired. The deputy, on application to modify his
order, took additional evidence and ordered the insurance company
to bear the expense of an operation and to pay compensation pending
Compton's recovery. On appeal the full commission reversed this
modified award, whereupon the circuit court, finding substantial
evidence to sustain the finding of the deputy, reversed the commission.
The insurance company and Compton's employer appealed to the
Supreme Court, which through Mr. Justice Terrell phrased the
70
question before it in this manner:
"... whether or not on appeal from an order of the Industrial
Commission to the Circuit Court, the court is limited to review
of the order of the Industrial Commission or may it review the
order of the Deputy Commissioner and reverse the order of
the Industrial Commission on the basis of his finding as to
the order of the Deputy Commissioner."
Deciding in favor of the insurance company and Compton's employer,
Mr. Justice Terrell said that the circuit court was required to review
the order of the full commission, not that of the deputy. 1
One year later came United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co.,72 the crucial case for both the substantial evidence rule
and the role of the deputy commissioner in the administrative process.
The facts were interesting, because of both the duality of the insurance
coverage and the frequently indeterminate character of backaches.
Livingston delivered beer for Southern Company, which was insured
in 1948 by Maryland Casualty Company and in 1949 by United States
Casualty Company. In 1948, while delivering a case of beer, Livingston sustained an injury diagnosed as a "sacro-iliac sprain" and was
treated at Maryland Casualty's expense. In 1949, again while delivering a case of beer, he suffered a disability diagnosed as a "ruptured nucleus pulposus of the fifth lumbar space." The question before the deputy commissioner was whether this was a new injury, to
be covered by United States Casualty, or a recurrence of the old, to
be paid for by Maryland Casualty. He found that the 1949 injury was
the result of the prior injury.73
701d. at 18.
71lbid.

So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
73Id. at 743.
7255
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Maryland Casualty appealed to the full commission, which affirmed
the deputy's findings and compensation award. Undaunted, Maryland
Casualty appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the commission;
and thereupon United States Casualty appealed to the Supreme Court.
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Hobson this Court stated the
principal question thus: 7".... to determine for the benefit of the bench and bar, as well
as the Florida Industrial Commission, just what weight the
full Commission should give to the Deputy Commissioner's
findings of facts when ... it performs its statutory duty of considering 'the matter upon the record .... '"
The correlative question was whether the Court should adhere to
its rule that the probity of the evidence is an issue for the Industrial
Commission, the findings of which should not be reversed unless
shown to be clearly erroneous. 75 In dealing with these questions the
majority at once took account of the 1941 amendment, for the first
time since its enactment.7 6 Quoting from the statute and noting its
patent inconsistency with the Sonny Boy's ruling, Mr. Justice Hobson
offered apologies:77
"Evidently in those cases which were decided by this Court
subsequent to the 1941 amendments, our attention was not
called to the impact of such amendments on our former rule
as to the weight to be given by the Circuit Court to the Commission's findings of facts, that is, that such findings should not
be overruled if there was competent substantial evidence to
support them."
Before disposing of the correlative question, the Court adjusted its
recently adopted substantial evidence rule to the new adjudication
T41bid.

75As laid down in Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1950):
Crawford v. Benrus Market, 40 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
76The decision was 6-1, Chapman, J., dissenting without opinion.
T7United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1951). As
to most of these cases the statement is accurate, but the anomalous nature of the
Supreme Court rule was specifically referred to as "odd" and "unexplained" in
Middleton, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Florida, 3 U. op FLA. L. Rxv.

281, 294 (1950).
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procedures stipulated by the Legislature and resolved the principal
question in favor of the administrative process: 78
"After the deputy commissioner has held a hearing, made his
findings of facts and entered the compensation order and a review is requested, the full Commission should adhere to the
findings of fact ... unless there is no competent substantial
evidence to sustain them."
The circuit court should determine whether the full commission
followed the substantial evidence rule, said the Court, "our former
adjudications rendered after the 1941 amendments . . . to the con79
trary notwithstanding." 1
As regards the recurring problem of the weight or probity of
the evidence, the majority opinion adapted the old master-chancellor
analogy to the exigencies of modem regulatory administration. Prior
to the McCall and Crawford cases the rule recapitulated in the
Strickland case was that the findings of the full commission were
worth about "the same weight and consideration which a chancellor
should properly give to the findings of law and fact of a master."8'
In the light of the 1941 amendment by the Legislature, and following
the analogy, the full commission rather than the circuit court now
becomes the chancellor: 81
"It is our view that under existing law the full Commission when reviewing a matter which has been heard by a
deputy commissioner should give to his findings of facts about
the same weight that this Court is required to give to the findings of facts made by a Chancellor, and the full Commission
should not reverse the findings of facts made by a deputy
commissioner unless it is made to appear that those findings
of facts are not sustained by competent, substantial evidence."
Professor Frank J. Goodnow's perennial admonition to students
of administrative law was, "Who got the money?" 8' 2 In Maryland
7SUnited States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1951).
'old. at 745.
soFlorida Forest and Park Serv. v. Stridcland, 154 Fla. 472, 480, 18 So.2d 251, 255

(1944).
s8United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 745 (Fla. 1951).
82HART, AN INTRODUOTION TO Avmufrh
ATWE LAw 19 (2d ed. 1950).
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Casualty Livingston was going to "get the money" in any event. From
the standpoint of the litigants the important question was, "Who
pays?" The decision reaffirmed the initial disposition of the case by
the deputy, so Maryland Casualty paid.
Over and above the cardinal significance of the ruling on the
questions of law in this dispute was the related importance of the
Court's remarks about fact-finding in workmen's compensation cases.
Recognizing that only the deputy is in a firsthand position to accumulate evidence, Mr. Justice Hobson's opinion stated that "under the
law as it presently exists, the full Commission, the Circuit Court and
this Court must evaluate the evidence upon a consideration of a cold
.,,3 Under these circumstances, what
typewritten transcript ..
weight should the findings of the deputy be accorded? Said the
Court: s
".

"Any fact-finding individual, group or board created as
such by lawful authority is at least acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity and as such fact-finding arbiter his, or its, findings are
entitled to great weight and should not be reversed unless there
is no competent, substantial evidence which supports such
findings."
One of the most complicated aspects of workmen's compensation
cases is the controversial nature of the medical testimony upon which,
somehow without equivocation, a valid decision must hinge. The
Maryland Casualty case aptly demonstrates the problem, for at bottom the disputed compensation order represented nothing if not
the deputy commissioner's conviction that the medical experts on
one side were right and those on the other side wrong. Who, other
than some medical expert, is competent to say that a "ruptured nucleus
pulposus of the fifth lumbar space," sustained in 1949, is or is not
the result of a "sacro-iliac sprain" incurred in 1948, each the unhappy experience of Livingston in the identical circumstance of his
delivering a case of beer? Further - and here's the rub - when the
experts disagree, who decides between them? Still more crucial,
perhaps, how is the decision made? Mr. Justice Hobson approached
these virtually insoluble problems with courage and intelligence,
holding that the strategic location of the deputy qualified him alone
s3United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1951).
S4Id. at 745.
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to make the choice; further, that the same strategic location was the
key to explaining how a valid choice might be made. 5
Later in 1951, on the authority of the Maryland Casualty case,
the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court ruling, but noted that
"neither the full Commission nor the Circuit Judge was aware of our
opinion . . . ."8 This case would have been one of distinction, if
only because the deputy commissioner, the full commission, and the
circuit court each made a different finding of fact. In addition the
latent controversy 87 within the Court over scope of review in these
cases bubbled to the surface in Mr. Justice Chapman's dissenting
opinion.88 The three different findings of fact reflected again the
imponderability of conflicting medical testimony. The deputy found
that the workman suffered from a "ten per cent permanent partial
loss of use of his back caused by arthritis which preceded the accident,"
and that half the disability was directly related to the accident. On
this finding the deputy ordered the employer's insurance company
to pay $19.20 per week for 17% weeks, the equivalent of a five percent
permanent partial disability.8 9
Upon review of the record the commission reversed its deputy,
finding instead a ten percent disability to the body as a whole and
directing the insurance company to pay $19.20 per week for 35 weeks,
twice the allowance ordered by the deputy. On the identical record
the circuit court reversed the commission, finding that the claimant,
up to the time of the hearing before the deputy with the exception of
three days, had a total and continuing disability to the body as a
whole. He awarded compensation at the rate of $19.20 per week until
termination of this total disability. 90 Invoking the substantial evidence
rule as construed in Maryland Casualty, Mr. Justice Hobson's majority
opinion directed the circuit court to reverse the commission and to
instruct it to uphold the findings of fact made by the deputy and
reinstate his award.
As in the preceding case, Mr. Justice Chapman was the sole dissenter; but this time he wrote an opinion. Taking his stand on the
85Ibid; see Butler, The Rising Tide of Expertise, 15 FoiD. L. REv. 19 (1946);
Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, 162 HARPERS 101 (Dec. 1930).
86Crescent City v. Green, 59 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1951).
87See note 76 supra.
asCrescent City v. Green, 59 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1951).
8O9bid.
gOlbid.
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leading cases decided before the Court began to apply the substantial
evidence rule to disputed workmen's compensation claims, he reaffirmed his conviction that "'the circuit court should give to the
findings of the commission about the same weight and consideration
which a chancellor should properly give to the findings . . . of a

master.'-1" He dismissed the substantial evidence pronouncements
in the transitional cases as "dicta" and, while conceding that they
might be construed to mean that a new and different rule had been
adopted, steadfastly insisted that the Strickland case was controlling.9 2
Despite the fact that Mr. Justice Chapman found no support among
his colleagues for reverting to the earlier position that "'no presumption obtains in favor of the correctness of the administrative determination of fact,'-93 the vitality of this position, even though operating
ostensibly within the confines of the substantial evidence rule, was
demonstrated by the recent circuit court decision in Duff v. Boca Raton
Club.- A deputy commissioner had based compensation on his finding of 50 percent disability, whereas the injured workman had claimed
100 percent and the employer and its insurance company had maintained only 15 percent. Here was a conflict of extremes. Both sides
appealed to the full commission, which found 100 percent. On appeal
to the circuit court the insurance company argued that the commission
had exceeded its proper scope of review as delineated in the Maryland
Casualty5 and Crescent City v. Green98 decisions; Circuit Judge Holt

acknowledged the fact-finder's dilemma when the experts disagree:
"As usual, there was medical testimony on both sides. The doctors
called by the claimant testified that the disability is 100 percent. Those
called by the employer and the insurance carrier testified that the disability is 15 percent."9 7 Had he accepted Mr. Justice Hobson's admonitions about the limitations of "a cold typewritten transcript" and
the strategic advantage of the deputy in the fact-finding process,9 s
Judge Holt might have reversed the full commission for exceeding
its proper scope of review. That he sustained the commission is a
testimonial to the inherent flexibility of the substantial evidence rule.
91id. at 4; see note 59 supra.
921d. at 7.
931d. at 4.
942 Fla. Supp. 144 (11th Cir. 1952).
95United States Cas Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 55 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
9859 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1951).
97Duff v. Boca Raton Club, 2 Fla. Supp. 144, 146 (11th Cir. 1952).
SsSee notes 83-85 supra and text thereat.
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Stating that the claimant had produced lay witnesses in addition to
experts, and finding that the insurance company's doctors had "ignored
or disregarded the conclusively proved and uncontradicted facts as
to the claimant's condition,"0' 9 Judge Holt ruled: "A careful study
of the testimony in this case makes it dear that there was no competent substantial evidence which accords with logic and reason to sustain any finding other than that of the full commission . . .100
With the lines thus sharply drawn between strict and loose construction of the substantial evidence rule, some clarification by- the
Supreme Court on appeal might have been helpful. The appeal was
dismissed, however, on the grounds that it was not filed within the
prescribed time and that certiorari did not lie in view of the statutory
right of appeal.10' Future developments in the newly arranged judicial
review of workmen's compensation awards'0 2 should be watched with
keen interest for any light they may throw upon the twilight zone
that exists between the Supreme Court's rulings in the Maryland and
Crescent City cases and the circuit court's decision in Duff v. Boca
Raton Chb.
REMOVAL FROM

PosrroN

OF PROTECTED TENURE

In cases reviewing the administrative removal of persons from
positions of protected tenure the Supreme Court has been about as
consistent in its use of terminology as in workmen's compensation
cases. But, whereas the verbal formula in Railroad Commission cases
has frequently been the threefold standard of "substantial competent
evidence of legal sufficiency," and whereas in Industrial Commission
cases it has usually been just "substantial competent evidence," here
the usage has with little variation been merely "substantial evidence,"
with occasional disturbing overtones about preponderance. 0 3
SBDuff v. Boca Raton Club, 2 Fla. Supp. 144, 146 (11th Cir. 1952).
lOOIbid.
1l0Boca Raton Club v. Duff, 63 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1953).
02See notes 60, 61 supra and text thereat.
103Pensacola v. Maxwell, 49 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1950); Miami v. Huttoe, 38 So.2d
819 (Fla. 1949); Nelson v. State ex rel. Quigg, 156 Fla. 189, 23 So.2d 156 (1945);
Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1944); Jenkins v. Curry, 154 Fla. 617,
18 So.2d 521 (1944); Callahan v. Curry, 153 Fla. 744, 15 So.2d 668 (1943); Laney
v. Board of Pub. Instr., 153 Fla. 728, 15 So.2d 748 (1943). The most important
variations have been: Curry v. Shields, 61 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1952) (preponderance and
legal sufficiency); Ringo v. Owens, 54 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1951) (competent testimony);
Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So.2d 131 (1942) (appropriate evidence); State
ex rel. Hathaway v. Williams, 149 Fla. 48, 5 So.2d 269 (1941) (legal evidence).
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A 1934 opinion marks the broadest position on scope of review
in this type of case: 10 4
"... regardless of the apparently conclusive force and effect
that the Courts have heretofore accorded to the findings and
decisions of administrative agencies . . . it is certain that the
function and prerogative of deciding finally the law and the
facts of an actual controversy bearing upon a vested legal right
sought to be divested or impaired in a proceeding initiated
under statute before an administrative tribunal is, in its
last analysis, a pure judicial power the exercise of which is
subject to review in courts of competent jurisdiction ....
"It is not within the power of the legislature to change the
nature of a judicial function by merely creating another
agency to participate in its performance."
This early statement of judicial supremacy seems to have been ignored
in the more recent cases in which the substantial evidence rule has
been followed. But here, as in the Railroad Commission and workmen's compensation cases, the impressive thing is that the judges'
predisposition toward the administrative process seems to be as
meaningful as any particular phraseology in which judicial opinions
are couched.
In a number of these cases the Court has held that there was no administrative finding of fact in the sense of legal sufficiency. When
Governor Holland dismissed Hathaway as Director of the Florida
State Employment Service because of inefficient operation of the
service as a whole, Hathaway appealed to the Merit System Council.
After an administrative hearing the council recommended that the
dismissal be sustained, and this judgment was affirmed by the Florida
Industrial Commission. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court
set aside this decision.105 Mr. Justice Terrell's opinion noted that
Hathaway had completed his probationary period and that "his
tenure became permanent, subject to removal for cause."' 0 But the
Merit System Council made no finding of fact, only stating its con2o4State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 201, 202, 156 So. 705, 707,

708 (1934).
0o5State ex rel. Hathaway v. Williams, 149 Fla. 48, 5 So.2d 269 (1941).
1O6d. at 55, 5 So.2d at 272.
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clusion that the dismissal was for cause, while the Industrial Commission merely affirmed this action. 07 In deciding against the removal
of Hathaway the Court summed up the case:' 0 s
"We find little or no legal evidence to support the order ....
It tends to show that a few incompetents were employed
....

that the petitioner was not always cooperative, and that

he appointed his daughter to a position over another of higher
rating, but she was shown to be competent and being so, that
is far from overcoming his service rating. We are therefore
driven to the conclusion than an erroneous rule of law was
applied to the evidence or that its legal effect was misconceived."
In 1942 and 1943 two important cases, Laney v. Board of Public
Instructionof and Laney v. Holbrook,"" reached the Court on the
issue of sufficiency of evidence to support dismissal of a public school
principal by a county board of education. Laney had a hearing before
the Orange County school board and was ousted from his position
on a total of seven charges- three of them for use of intoxicating
liquors, three for attempted seduction, and one for seeking unlawful
permission to sell bolita tickets. The Supreme Court held that it
could reach no decision as to the adequacy of the evidence because
none had been presented: there were no specific findings of fact, only
a general and inadequate "verdict of guilty" by the board."
Laney had another hearing before the board, in which it made
findings of fact prior to reaffirming his dismissal. Considering the
case for the second time, the Court gave its first explicit view of the
1071d. at 57, 5 So.2d at 273.

lOSlbid.
'109153 Fla. 728, 15 So.2d 748 (1943).
120150 Fla. 622, 8 So.2d 465 (1942).
"'Ibid. But cf. Little Man's Club v. Schott, 60 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1952), in which
the Court acknowledged that there had been no formal finding of fact by the
Director of the Beverage Commission in revoking a liquor license, but said,
".... we take refuge in the thought that no harmful error has been committed,"
and served warning, in a bit of verbal finger-waggling, that ".

.

. a failure to make

findings in future cases may well constitute such error as to require quashing the
orders .... " Again in Hime v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 61 So.2d 182 (Fla.
1952), in which the commission allegedly made no findings of fact in suspending a
license, the Court held that such findings were unnecessary because under the
statute failure to respond on notice constituted acceptance of the truth of the charge.
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substantial evidence rule under these circumstances in an opinion by
112
Mr. Justice Brown:
"The general rule is that administrative findings, in order
to be upheld by the courts must be supported by substantial
evidence. This means that there must be evidence which supports a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can
be reasonably inferred. It must do more than create a suspicion
of the fact to be established, and must be such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
This standard, when applied to the board's action, prompted the
Court to find a lack of sufficient evidence. The findings on the charges
of attempted seduction, which were deemed the most serious, seemed
only to indicate, at the most, that Laney had once told a high-school
girl that she had "lovely limbs," and that while she typed his master's
thesis he dictated certain lewd and titillative suggestions to her. As
to the board's findings of intoxication the main evidence seemed to
be testimony of two lady teachers who, though they had never seen
Laney drink, maintained that they had smelled liquor on his breath
and that he was sometimes lighthearted and facetious in conversation.
On these bits of evidence the Court strongly suspected that they had
smelled an alcoholic shaving lotion and that facetiousness does not
prove intoxication. Furthermore, one of the ladies "was an aspirant
for the principalship if Mr. Laney should be put out."' 1 3 And so it
went. Most of the testimony covered recollections of isolated events
in a period running from February 1937 to June 1941; and none of
it could, in the Court's mind, meet the test of the substantial evidence
rule. The decision of the board was accordingly reversed.
Earlier in 1943, before the second Laney case, the sharply divided
four-to-three decision in Hammond v. Curry"x4 dramatized the differences in judicial attitudes toward administrative adjudications.
Hammond, a Miami vice-squad operative, had been discharged by
the city manager after embarrassing the police department by erroneously arresting, on instruction, a supposedly virtuous young woman
whose description coincided with that of a suspected prostitute. In a
choice of language that subsequently was to plague the Court, Mr.
ll2Laney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 153 Fla. 728, 738, 15 So.2d 748, 753 (1943).
13d, at 731, 15 So.2d at 750.
"14153 Fla. 245, 14 So.2d 390 (1943).
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Justice Thomas observed:';
"We are not unaware of the rule found in some of the earlier
cases ... restricting the power of the court in its examination
into proceedings for the removal of officials; however, the rule
has been relaxed to the extent that the courts will explore the
record to determine whether there is any evidence to substantiate the charges."
After exploring the record the Court found that, irrespective of the
city's liability for false arrest, nothing greater than an error of judgment had been established; therefore it held that Hammond "should
not have suffered the ignominy of dismissal .

. . ."116

In seeming

abandonment of a moderately construed substantial evidence rule
Mr. Justice Thomas and his three supporting brethren added that "it
was the city's burden to prove this charge, as well as the others, by
a preponderance of the evidence."117 The dissent, written by Mr.
Justice Buford and concurred in by Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice
Sebring, came quickly to the point: "The Court cannot reach the
conclusion that the officer vested with the exercise of discretion has
abused that discretion merely because the Court, on consideration of
the record, would have reached a different conclusion."'1 s
In 1944 the Supreme Court reviewed a circuit court denial of
mandamus to reinstate the Fort Lauderdale chief of police, who had
been dismissed by the city manager for cause under the local civil
service rules."19 One of the charges was "conduct unbecoming an
officer." The evidence was that he had played golf, had imbibed two
drinks at the clubhouse, had taken a shower, had put on his uniform,
and had then been involved in an accident while driving away in a
city-owned automobile. Mr. Justice Thomas, in sustaining the removal, said that the evidence would be examined "only to the extent
of determining whether there was any substantial evidence to substantiate the charges, refraining from weighing that testimony or comparing it to testimony offered in refutation."'

20

Recognizing both

the imprecision of the charge and the strength of the testimony
offered on behalf of petitioner, the Court still felt "constrained to
15Id. at 247, 14 So.2d at 391.
"Aad. at 252, 14 So.2d at 393.
7MId, at 251, 14 So.2d at 393, Terrell, Adams, and Chapman, JJ., concurring.
1181d. at 256, 14 So.2d at 395.
"Bccker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1944).
1l0d, at 382, 20 So.2d at 914.
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hold that there was evidence, even though controverted, to support
the charge of improper conduct of such degree as to be denominated
'unbecoming'." 12' Counsel sought. rehearing 22 emphasizing what
they took to be an inconsistency between the Court's reluctance to
weigh the evidence in this case and Mr. Justice Thomas' own recent
implication that the rule against doing so had been relaxed. 23 Whether the Court's proper scope of review is any broader under mandamus than certiorari was also questioned. In explaining denial of
the petition the Court through Mr. Justice Brown, who had joined
in the Hammond v. Curry dissent,'12 observed that he did not regard
the instant denial as a departure from Hammond v. Curry. 25 His
discussion of cases on scope of review under mandamus and certiorari
26
concluded:
"It is not necessary here for us to determine whether the
scope of appellate review is broader in certiorari cases than in
mandamus cases. But the writer is of the view that the opinion
of Mr. Justice THOMAS [sic] in this case goes about as far as
this Court can go, under the authorities, in dealing with the
scope of appellate review of judgments in mandamus cases attacking the orders of administrative boards."
Six years later, in Pensacola v. Maxwell,127 the Court was confronted with an appeal from a circuit court decision reversing a
municipal civil service board on the strength of the "rule has been
relaxed" and "preponderance of the evidence" statements in Hammond v. Curty. Maxwell had been dismissed by the Pensacola board
on a finding that he had tried to extort money from the proprietor
of a social dub run by a veteran's organization. In reversing the
circuit court five to two Mr. Justice Sebring's majority opinion sought
earnestly to dispel the misunderstandings brought on by the earlier
case. Noting that on the authority of Hammond v. Curry the circuit
judge had reweighed the evidence to determine where the preponderance lay, the opinion asserted that "no such holding was ever
121d. at 383, 20 So.2d at 914.
122d at 384, 20 So.2d at 914.
' 2 3See notes 115, 117 supra and text thereat.
124153 Fla. 245, 252, 14 So.2d 390, 393 (1943).
l25Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 384, 20 So.2d 912, 914 (1944).
2261d, at 386, 20 So.2d at 916.
l27Pensacola v. Maxwell, 49 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1950).
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intended," and carefully spelled out a moderate construction of the
substantial evidence rule:128
"The court may inquire into the jurisdiction of the administrative body whose order is challenged. It may inspect the
record of the proceedings before the administrative body to
ascertain whether that body has proceeded in accordance with
the authority conferred upon it by controlling law. It may examine the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to justify the finding of the administrative body. It may
not reweigh the evidence for the purpose of determining where
the preponderance lies, nor [sic] substitute its judgment as to
the credibility of witnesses for that of the body charged with
the duty of determining the facts."
Between 1942 and 1949 the Court reviewed five important cases
involving action against members of the Miami police force. Two
dismissals were upheld in short opinions citing the substantial evidence rule.12 9 In a third case the Court seems to have weighed the
evidence in reversing the administrative board on two of six stipulated
charges cited in reducing an inspector of police to patrolman. Mr.
Justice Whitfield wrote for the Court: "When the explanatory answers
of the inspector to charges 4 and 5 are considered with the entire
evidence adduced, the order of the board is not justified."'O3 In a
fourth case Miami had dismissed its chief of police for failure to
preserve order during a wartime bus strike; but on writ of quo warranto the circuit court had ousted his successor. Mr. Justice Hobson's
opinion on appeal noted the seriousness and untimeliness of traffic
hazards and disorders accompanying a bus strike "when the members
of our armed forces dice with death on the far-flung battle fronts
.. ..,,13"
Calling attention to the fact that "it is not the province of
an appellate court to try cases de novo on a cold typed transcript ... "
the decision reversed the lower court on the basis of the substantial
evidence rule.132
2281d. at 528, Chapman and Roberts, JJ., dissenting without opinion.
1-0Jenkins v. Curry, 154 Fla. 617, 18 So.2d 521 (1944); Callahan v. Curry, 153
Fla. 744, 15 So.2d 668 (1943).
13ONelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 605, 10 So.2d 131, 136 (1942). The charges
were that he had lied about his age and his prior military service.
iSINelson v. State ex rel. Quigg, 156 Fla. 189, 192, 23 So.2d 136, 137 (1945).
1321d. at 191, 23 So.2d at 137.
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In the fifth case a police lieutenant had been temporarily suspended
by the chief on seventeen grounds certified to the city manager. 1 3
After a hearing the civil service board voted "not guilty" three to
two and unanimously recommended reinstatement. The city manager disregarded the board's action and dismissed the lieutenant. The
Supreme Court, affirming issuance of mandamus by the circuit court,
ruled that the city manager should have affirmed the board's decision.
Mr. Justice Hobson's opinion called attention to the inherent advantage of the board in the fact-finding process; those who have before
them ". . . the witnesses whose demeanor and conduct may be observed are ... in a much better position to determine the truth or
falsity of the evidence than is the person, or the court, who must
make such determination upon 'a cold typed transcript'." 134 After
finding "substantial evidence in the transcript" to sustain the findings
and recommendations of the Board, the opinion unfortunately added
that "the preponderance of the evidence also upholds the Board's conclusions.""13 The opinion does not indicate that this afterthought
contributed to the decision or that it was intended to be any more
than a passing observation; but Cury v. Shields,236 decided in 1952
under somewhat different circumstances, referred to this language in
overruling suspension by the Florida Real Estate Commission of the
licenses of certain realtors after an administrative adjudication comprising appearance before an examiner and testimony and final
hearing before the commission. The circuit court, acting within its
province on review, 37 held the commission in error in its finding of
alteration and recordation of a written agreement to purchase. Specifically, it found that the agreement had been altered, in effect, by
consent of the parties and that consequently the commission's finding
was inconsistent with the evidence. The Supreme Court sustained
this reversal, following Miami v. Huttoe, as "contrary to the manifest
preponderance of the evidence .... The legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Real Estate Commission may
always be reviewed."'138
138Miami v. Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1949); see also note 85 supra.
134id. at 820.
1351d. at 821.
'INCurry v. Shields, 61 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1952).
13TFLA. STAT. §475.31 (1951) provides that findings of the Real Estate Commission
shall have the same force and effect as a master's.13SCurry v. Shields, 61 So.2d 326, 327, 328 (Fla. 1952); cf. Ringo v. Owens,
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CONCLUSION

The Florida Supreme Court has stated the substantial evidence
rule in different ways; but regardless of terminology its holdings seem
to run a broad gamut between weighing all the evidence to ascertain
preponderance and merely considering whether the evidence adduced
reasonably supports the administrative conclusion derived from it.
In many instances the requirement has been overloaded with further
insistence upon "competency" or "legal sufficiency."
According to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, the rule, even when
"reasonableness" is utilized as the main gauge of substantiality3
".. . is unprecise and susceptible of different applications by
different courts or even by the same court in different cases.
Any attempt to make the test more specific is likely to be unprofitable. The scope of the judicial inquiry is not rigidly held
to a single and unalterable degree but necessarily varies in accordance with the needs of particular cases .... Some play in
the joints is probably both inevitable and desirable. The words
of a formula are not and never have been a wooden mold into
which all the variables and imponderables must be fitted. The
history of judicial review abundantly demonstrates that irrespective of formulas the judges will manage to maintain
ample elbow room for taking into account special needs of
particular cases."
The Florida courts have had "ample elbow room." It is obvious
that the substantial evidence rule in Florida administrative law is
not a predictive formula, much less a button to be pushed. However
phrased, it can scarcely be more than a rough, ad hoc guide, contingent on changing circumstances, inarticulate major premises, and
what the judges themselves happen to think the rule means as they
study each new "cold typed transcript."140
With some healthy skepticism, then, the conclusion is advanced
54 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1951).
13
9DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 915 (1951).
14 0HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADmNIsTrAT&'E LAw 686 (2d ed. 1950), alludes
to the substantial evidence requirement in the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act and suggests that ". . . the crudal thing is the attitude with which the reviewing judge approaches the question. The divergence in the basic predilections
of a McReynolds and a Black would produce different results, within certain
limits, under any verbal formula."
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that the scope of judicial review under the substantial evidence rule
in Florida administrative law has been a shade broader in Railroad
and Public Utilities Commission cases than in recent workmen's compensation cases, and broader in workmen's compensation cases than in
cases of removal from a position of protected tenure - notwithstanding
the fact that within each of these three areas there are significant differences of application about as great as the differences separating the
areas themselves. With few exceptions the Supreme Court has used
the threefold standard of "competency," "substantiality," and "legal
sufficiency" in the first area only; in the second it has largely used the
twofold standard of "competency" and "substantiality"; and in the
third it has usually rested on "substantiality" alone. This means that
the Court has reviewed orders of the Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission, and to only a slightly lesser degree those dealing with
workmen's compensation, on the basis of a substantial evidence rule
expressed in terms very nearly the same as those in the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act,1 41 which in turn is virtually the same
thing as the old "residuum" rule developed by the New York courts
about the time of the first World War in reviewing workmen's compensation awards. Under the residuum rule, regardless of the kind of
evidence that the administrative agency is authorized to accept,
"... still in the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to
support the claim ....
There must be in the record some evidence of
a sound, competent, and recognizedly probative character to sustain
the findings and award ... ,"142
Professor Wigmore rejects this alleged attempt at compromise between the common law rules of evidence and the particular mission
of regulatory administration as a "pseudo-liberal rule" which, though
plausible, is still not acceptable because it still virtually requires the
tribunal to test its proceedings by the jury-trial rules, and thus holds
out the temptations to practitioners to employ the whole arsenal of
technical weapons and secure a record full of "errors."' 143 In Wigmore's view, any attempt to apply strictly the jury-trial rules of evidence to an administrative tribunal acting without a jury is a
1419A U.L.A. §12 (Supp. 1952). It provides that the reviewing court may reverse or modify the decision if the "; . . administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... unsupported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted .... "
142 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113 N.E. 507, 509 (1916).
1431 WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§4a, 4b, 4c (3d ed. 1940).
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historical anomaly, predestined to probable futility and failure. In
a strong plea for broadening the latitude of administrative decisionmaking by strictly limiting the scope of review under the substantial
144
evidence rule he says:
". • . if there is any part of administrative activity to which
this independence of formal rules can most readily be conceded, it is the task of weighing evidence and deciding on
facts. For there do not yet exist any known rules for controlling the correctness of that mental process. The jury trial
rules merely determine what evidence may be considered; they
tell us nothing as to the mental process of weighing it. The
great ultimate process of reaching a conviction is not one for
which we can offer the administrator any sure guide. Why not
trust his expert intelligence and good faith? Let us remember
that the greatest part of the community's industrial, commercial and financial activity already functions on a solid basis of
fact determined without any formal rules of proof. Let us,
here too, put our trust in men and minds, rather than in rules."
Wigmore contends that the residuum rule is decidedly not the wise and
satisfactory rule for general adoption.
145
Professor Davis takes the same position:
"But it is the administrative process that is demonstrating
through extensive experience the practical success of receiving
.any oral or documentary evidence' and of giving it such probative weight as the finder of fact thinks it deserves in the particular record. The achievements of the administrative process
are sharpening the dissatisfaction with intricate rules that require exclusion of evidence having substantial probative effect."
Commissioner Robert M. Benjamin's famous report to the Governor of New York 146 argued impressively against retention of the
residuum rule in the jurisdiction that gave it birth; and recent cases
141 id. §4b.
ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 473 (1951). See also his Evidence Reform: The
Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1950); An Approach
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364 (1942).
145DAVIS,

1461

BENJAMIN, -ADMINISTRATIVE

ADJUDICATION

IN

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

181-194 (1942), a comprehensive survey in one summary volume and five supporting
volumes.
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by the highest New York court seem to show modification of the
concept even though they fall short of abandoning it.'14
In view of the preponderance of eminent authority against broadening the substantial evidence rule to include various technical indicators of the weight to be accorded findings of fact, it is somewhat
perplexing to find the Model State Administrative Procedure Act
phrased, as to scope of review, in a manner which these authorities
could not approve. Dean E. Blythe Stason, one of the leaders in the
movement for administrative procedure legislation in the states, apparently sides with the other authorities in dissenting from the requirement of the model act that there be "competent, material, and
1 48
substantial evidence":
"Presumably the addition of the word 'competent' will require
that under the model act there shall be at least a little legally
competent evidence to support each finding of essential fact,
a requirement reminiscent of the 'residuum of evidence' rule
developed in the early New York workmen's compensation
cases. The wisdom and utility of the requirement are questionable."
Another authority, Professor Nathanson, says with reference to the
model act, "It does seem to me unfortunate to couple the phrase
'substantial evidence' with other phrases which may suggest that common-law rules of evidence must be considered in determining the
149
weight to be accorded to the evidence."'
Professor Heady's examination of administrative procedure legislation in the states of California, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin suggests: 150
"The practical consequences of using the phrasing of the
Model Act cannot be determined because the words 'competent'
and 'material' do not appear in the federal act or in any of the
acts in force in the states considered, except Missouri, where
'competent and substantial' evidence is required.
14 7See, e.g., Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d 886 (1943).
148Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REv.

196, 208 (1948).
140Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law,
33 IowA L. REv. 252, 289 (1948).
50
' HEADY, ADinNsm.rTvE PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN TiE STATES 110 (1 52).
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".. . and this has meant an increase in the scope of judicial
review in Missouri."
If the purpose of this section of the model act is to increase the scope
of judicial review Florida will gain little if anything by adopting
it, as far as cases involving the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and workmen's compensation are concerned, because the
Supreme Court standards already developed, "competent substantial
evidence of legal sufficiency" on the one hand and "competent substantial evidence" on the other, are every bit as broad as the standard
of the model act. The same would probably hold for the many states,
cited by Wigmore, which have followed the old New York residuum
rule.
A decade ago Dean Stason concluded, after a thorough appraisal
1 51
of the substantial evidence rule:
".. . the term 'substantial evidence,' should be construed to
confer finality upon an administrative decision on the facts
when, upon an examination of the entire record, the evidence,
including the inferences therefrom, is found to be such that a
reasonable man, acting reasonably, might have reached the
decision; but, on the other hand, if a reasonable man, acting
reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the evidence and its inferences then the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence and it should be set aside."
This comes close to the position of the United States Supreme Court,
some years before passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, defining substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."' 52 In reviewing cases of removal
from a position of protected tenure the Florida Supreme Court has
usually omitted the tests of competency and legal sufficiency, and in
5

l lStason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. oF PA. L. Rxv.

1026, 1038 (1941).
152Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Court apparently held that the
Administrative Procedure Act, in its stipulation that the whole record disclose

substantial evidence, intended a closer surveillance by the courts to assure reasonable
administrative action. But cf. the scathing dissent in O'Leary v. Brown-PacificMaxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 510 (1951), in which three justices accuse the majority
of finding '"facts where there are no facts, on the whole record or any piece of it."
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some cases its construction of the substantial evidence rule has been
15 3
couched in terms entirely consistent with those just quoted.
In Florida, then, there are broad differences both in the expression
and application of the substantial evidence rule in judicial review,
from one administrative undertaking to the next. The unmistakable
corollary is that the subtleties of language and the imponderability of
the human factor in the judicial process enable the courts to utilize
one verbalism as readily as another to achieve any result they have in
mind. Yet the substantial evidence rule is supposed to represent a
middle ground, somehow, between according either the administrative
or the judicial authorities an unbounded discretion in determining
facts. The irreducible dilemma is that, depending on the conceptualism of the judges, even such an intended middle ground sometimes
gobbles up one or the other of the extremes.
In Dean Stason's view the "rule of reason" is the best guide to a
moderate interpretation of the substantial evidence rule. But judges
equally learned, and presumably equally reasonable, sometimes disagree. Perhaps the ultimate result is "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
Professor Davis' caveat immediately comes to mind. 5 4 Men, of course,
are not robots; and at this juncture the riddle implicit in the concept
of "reasonableness" becomes undecipherable.
This inevitable intrusion of the human element does not mean
that the existing confusion must be accepted; but it does mean that
any suggested improvements must be advanced within the limits
imposed by the circumstances, and as ameliorations rather than
panaceas. In Florida, as everywhere in the United States, the courts
must be open to all who are injured by the administrative process. In
a democracy there are impressive and unanswerable arguments for
judicial review of administrative actions, either in special administrative courts, as in France, or in the regular courts, as in the British
Commonwealth and the United States. In Florida, consideration
might well be given to the creation of a special administrative court
as one method of relieving the Supreme Court in its losing battle
against a constantly mounting volume of appeals.
Whatever the structure adopted, however, there are also sound
arguments against too extensive a judicial review of decisions by administrative authorities. There is always the danger that the courts
15 3E.g., Laney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 153 Fla. 728, 15 So.2d 748 (1943); cf.
Miles v. State, 160 Fla. 523, 36 So.2d 182 (1948).
154See note 139 supra and quotation in tcxt thereat.
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will replace administrative judgments with their own, even though
judges cannot legitimately substitute their own choice for those entrusted by the people to the discretion of legislatures, or by the legislatures and the people to the discretion of administrative agencies,
without arrogating unto themselves power that properly belongs elsewhere. The judiciary is neither the only nor even the most important
part of our system; "... courts are not charged with general guardianship against all potential mischief in the complicated tasks of government."' 55 Perhaps even more serious for a democratic polity are
certain implications of "government by judiciary." Administrative
authorities as much as courts and legislatures need room in which to
develop institutional skill, traditions of fairness, and standards of
accountability. "Interference by the courts is not conducive to the
development of habits of responsibility in administrative agencies."'5 8
Judicial overzealousness, paternalism, or mollycoddling only produces
an atmosphere in which the responsible exercise of administrative
discretion can never flourish.
Furthermore, extensive review places an intolerable burden on
the courts. It would be foolhardy for judges to try the cases de novo
on the "cold typed transcripts," and yet there is no other practical
way for them to consider the cases at all. This difficulty, of course,
is true of the whole appellate procedure, not just of review of administrative decisions. With dockets ever more crowded, with perhaps too
few judges, and with many of our courts archaically organized and
managed, the wheels of justice turn slowly as it is; and under these
burdens they grind, in some quarters, creakingly close to a halt.
In a number of important decisions the Florida Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Hobson, has sensibly acknowledged the strategic
advantages of administrative fact-finding bodies over the courts, which
must review on the record only.157 There is no intrinsic reason why
administrative agencies, with their special talents, cannot find facts
and make valid decisions even though they function through procedures quite different from those one would expect to find in the
courts. For one thing, administrative agencies, in their power to initiate investigations, have a vital fact-finding tool and instrument of
policy which courts lack. "Administrative adjudication, like equity,
is an adaptation of the judicial process to situations where the con125FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940).
2501bid.
1S7See note 85 suipra.
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ventional legal procedure tends to defeat rather than to promote the
ends of justice." 158
Finally, while recognizing the necessity of judicial review, it is
also worth remembering that there must be an end somewhere as to
both law and facts and that each added level of appeal represents
another cost. In the extreme, to the extent that ability to foot the
bill is unequal, too many levels of appeal and too broad a scope of
review up the ladder tend to weight the system in favor of those who
can afford to go all the way and equip themselves with what Wigmore calls "the whole arsenal of technical weapons."'1 In this connection it is interesting to note that the sheer volume of appellate
cases in Florida is greatest in those procedural areas in which the
substantial evidence rule has been so formulated as to foster the
greatest likelihood of upsetting administrative findings, and that here
the petitioners have usually not been individuals of limited means
but rather corporations engaged in the transportation or insurance
businesses.
For a generation our courts in Florida, as in the country at large,
have been grudgingly and gradually conceding the capacity of administrative agencies to govern -largely, perhaps, because the courts also
follow the election returns. In some quarters outright disfavor has
given way before an emergent judicial tolerance reflecting the additional fact that some agencies have been able to build operating traditions that command judicial respect. The vast complexity of this
age and the strength of our libertarian traditions jointly impose the
burden of shaping the potentialities of the administrative process
to the service of both public purpose and individual freedom.
Striking and holding such an intricate balance will command the best
efforts of students of government, public administrators, bench, and
bar. Part of the balance is to be found in a properly limited scope
of judicial review in administrative law. Here the key seems to be
a level of judicial statesmanship that will construe moderately a substantial evidence rule, unencumbered by notions, such as "competency"
and "legal sufficiency," that suggest an out-of-context devotion to the
technicalities of the common law. In Florida, as elsewhere, we need
to concentrate our energies on improvement of the administrative
process rather than on the elaboration or perpetuation of subtle means
of by-passing it in favor of the judiciary.
158SwEsoN, FEDERAL ADMINimTRATVE LAW 315 (1952).
lugSee note 143 supra and text thereat.
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